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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

a.

Nature of the Case.
This is the opening brief of Lance and Jennifer I-Iolcomb, dlbla Holcomb

Construction in support of the appeal from Judge Bradbury's Memorandum Decision and
Order awarding $106,049.29 in attorney fees and $14,215 64 in costs to the Plaintiffs,
Bradley J. Zenner and Allason M. Zenner.
b.

Partv References.
Lance Holcomb and Jemifer Holcomb d/b/a Holcomb Construction are referredlo as

"Holcomb", Bradley J. Zenner and Allason M. Zenner are refcrred to as "Zenner" for
purposes of this argument.
c.

Factual Statement and Procedural History.
This matter was tried before a Lewis County Jury between October 1, 2007 and

October 16,1007. The jury entered averdict against Holcomb for $40,000.00 (R. p. 2). The
resulting Judgment has been paid and a Partial Satisfactioil of Judgment has been entered.
Zenner submitted a Memorandum of Costs and an Affidavit of Attorney fees which
was timely contested by Holcomh. The Court heard oral argument on November 2 1,2007
and subsequently entered a Memorandum Decision and Order on January 8,2008 awarding
Zenners their "actual" lawyers fees and costs.

An Amended Judgment on verdict was entered on January 1 1,2008 for attorney fees
in the amount of $106,049.29 and costs in the amount of $14,215.64 for a total judgment of
fees and costs in the amount of $120,264.93.
Only the award of Costs and Attorney Fees is before the Court on appeal.
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1

11.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

Holcomb identifies four issues on appeal:

1. The Trial Court abused it's discretion in determining that Zenner was the
prevailing party.
2. The Trial Court erred in it's award of attorney fees by failing to consider the

factors set out in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3).
3. The Trial C o w erred in it's award of costs by failing to consider the
requirements of I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l).

4. Holcomb is entitled their attorney fees and costs on appeal.
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111.

ARGUMENT
ISSUE 1

The Trial Court abused it's discretion in determining that Zenner was theprevailing
party
A trial court's determination as to which party, if any, prevailed, is discretionary.
Holmes v, Holmes, 125 Idaho 784, 787,874 P.2d595 (Ct.App 19941, citingBadel1v. Badell,
122 Idaho 442, 450, 835 P 2d 677, 685 (Ct.App 1992). The exercise of that discretion is
guided by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(~).'
The factors considered by this Court reviewing an exercise of the trial court's
discretion are: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any
legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision
by an exercise of reason. Lettunich v. Letlunich, -Idaho -,

185 P.3d 258 (2008) 11,

Pu:u

citing Sun ValleyShopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87,94,803 P.2d 993,
I000 (1991).

'

I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) provides:
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial
court shall in its sound discretion consider the fu~aljudgment or result of the action ill
relation to the relief sought by the respective parties, whether there were multiple claims,
multiple issues, counterclaims, third party claims, cross-claims, or other multiple or cross
issues between the parties, and the extent to which each party prevailed upon each of such
issue ol.claims. The trial c o w in its sound discretion may determine that aparty to an action
prevailed in part and did not prevail in pal, and upon so finding may apportion the costs
between and among the paties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the
issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained.
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a

Here, the Trial Court seems to perceive the issue as one of discretion. R. p. 00016.
However, the Trial Court did not act within the boundaries and consistent with the legal
standards applicable to specific choices available to the Trial Court nor did the Trial Court
engage in an exercise of reason.
The Trial Court noted that both parties argued the amount of the Offer of Judgment as
consideration of whether or not Zenner was the prevailing party, and determined that "[slince
the contract provides that the award of lawyer's fees and costs depends on who is the
prevailing party, I conclude that it is proper to consider the Offers of Judgment for that
purpose." Id. at 00017.
The Trial Court improperly used the offer ofjudgment, I.R.C.P. 68, to determine the
prevailing party for the purpose of awarding attorney fees. In Ireland v. Ireland, 123 Idaho

955, 961, 855 P.2d 40 (1993), the Trial Court found that Milton Ireland was the prevailing
party in significant part and awarded him his attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 and
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1). In support of this finding, the court cited Milton's offer ofjudgment under
I.R.C.P. 68. 123 Idaho at 961.
The Idaho Supreme Court, in considering whether the trial court abused it's discretion
in awarding attorney fees, found that the court should not have used Rule 68 to support an
award of attorney fees.
Rule 68 "is intended to protect a defendant against a plaintiffs claim for costs
where the defendant has made a reasonable offer of judgment and where the
verdict recovered by the plaintiff is less favorable than the offer." Vulk v.
Haley, 112 Idaho 855, 859, 736 P.2d 1309, 1313 (1987). Rule 68 is not
intended to orovide for an award of attorney fees. Id This rule applies only to
judgments obtained by plaintiffs, putting a special burden on prevailing
plaintiffs to whom a settlement offer is made to show that they are entitled to
costs. Jones v. Berezay, 120 Idaho 332, 334, 815 P.2d 1072, 1074 (1991).
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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Id. (Emphasis added). Therefore, the Trial Court abused its discretion in considering the
I.R.C.P. 68 offer ofjudgment in relation to an award of attorney fees.
Further, in deciding that Zenner was the prevailing party, the Trial Court abused its
discretion in considering factors beyond those allowed by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B)". . . the Trial
Court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in
relation to the relief sought by the respective parties.") The court improperly considered the
other damages recoverable in addition to the jury award, and the extent to which the Zenner
had a choice in proceeding to trial and the parties participation in the settlement process. R.
p. 00018. Under no circu~nstancesshould the Trial Court consider in it's determination of
which party was the prevailing party evidence of the parties participation in pretrial dispute
reso~ution.~
Zenner sought $120,000 in damages. The jury only awarded $40,000 in dam
Considering the "other damages recoverable," which are based on the determination of who
is the prevailing party, it is an abuse of discretion to use the amount of attorney fees and costs
which would go to the prevailing party to decide the prevailing party. 111doing so, the Trial
,

Court is essentially "using the word to define the word." Such circular reasoning is not a
proper exercise of reason, and is instead an abuse of discretion.
Additionally, if properly considered, and in light of the jury's award of only one-third
of the damages sought, the court would have reasoned that I-folcomb,not Zenner is was the
party that actually did not have a choice but to proceed to trial and prevailed given the

I.R.E. 507 contemplates that the Court would not be making assumptions about the conduct of preb.ial dispute
resolution in determining who might be the prevailing party.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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available choices to it. Finally, it appears from the Court's analysis that Zenner is rewarded
for their participation in the "litigation" dispute resolution process meanwhile Holcomb is to
be punished for his failure to "settle" the matter in the dispute resolution process
The Trial Court's analysis is simply a risk analysis supported only by ihe Court's
subjective analysis and not an application of1.R.C.P. 54(d) and other appropriate Idaho Law.
The Trial Court does not clearly articulate in a way consistent with I.R.C.P.
54(d)(l)(B), its basis for concluding that Zenner is the prevailing party. The Trial Court's
failure to do so demonstrates that the Court erred in its exercise of discretion.

ISSUE 2

The Trial Court erred in it's award of attorneyfees byfailing to consider thefactors
set out in 1R.C.P. 54(e)(3).
The review of the Court's exercise of discretion in the award of attorney fees requires
consideration the same three factors. Id. Lettunich 11. However, here the Trial Court
determined that it did not have discretion in determining the amount of fees to award based
upon the "plain meaning" of the parties contract. Since the contract did not provide a
"reasonableness" qualification to the amount of attorney fees and costs to be awarded, the
entirety of the fees were awarded by the Trial Court.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Specifically the Trial Court determined it was not necessary to consider the
application of the factors of I.R.C.P. 54(e) in determining the appropriateness of the amount
to be awarded in attorney fees.3
I.R.C.P. 54(e) allows an award of "reasonable attorney fees, which at the discretion of
the court may include paralegal fees" to the prevailing party "when provided for by any
statute or contract. . . . ."
The Trial Court erred in its conclusion that;
"the Supreme Court did not intend to impose areasonableness standard on a
contract where none was contracted for. Rather it intended for Civil Rule
54(e)(l) to allow, and for Civil Rule S4(e)(3) to provide, standards for
determining what is reasonable only when court involvement is contemplated
as a component of the contract."
Memorandum Decision and Order, R. p. 00024-25.
Rule 54(e) permits an award of reasonable attorney fees when provided for by statute
or contract. It would strain the plain meaning of I.R.C.P. 54(e) to interpret that to mean that
a contract must provide for "reasonable attorney fees", in order to apply the factors of

I.R.C.P. 54(e). The Rule encompasses any contract providing for attorney fees, not just
those in which the contract (or statute) provides for "reasonable" attorney fees. Leztzmich v.

+k
Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425, 111 P.3d 110 (2005).

01

bf'b

\

This conclusion of the Trial Court is in stark contrast to the Trial Court's use of I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) to
determine who is the prevailing party. See Memorandum Decision and Order, R. p. 00016.
APPELLANT'S BRIER
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Furlher, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), "in the event the court grants attorney fees.. .it

shallconsider the following factors. . . ." Therefore, if the Trial Court grants attorney fees, it
is reauired to consider the 54(e)(3) factors. Id Lettunich I atp 435
The trial court's Order merely touched on Rule 54(e)(3)(B) in noting the complexity
of the case, R. p. 00015, and 54(e)(3)(G) in discussing that Holcomb's attorney fees were
$54,000. R. p. 00019. The Trial Court did not mention that Zenner's attorney fees were
almost twice what Holcomb incurred. R. p. 00027.
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This Court recently did not equivocate in the appropriateness of applying the factors
of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). Lettunich v. Lettunich, -Idaho _,

185 P.3d 258, (2008), citing

Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 902, 104 P. 3d 367, 376 (2004).~However, there is no other
indication that the Trial Court considered the 54(e)(3) factors or used them to analyze the
amount to be awarded. In fact, the Trial Court ruled that the Zenner was entitled to their
"actual" lawyer fees and costs. R. p. 00025. Thus, the Trial Court erred in not considering
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) factors as required.s

4

Subsequent to the Trial Court's Menlorandurn Decision and Order the Idaho Supreme Court decided Lettunich
v. Lettunich, -Idaho _, 185P.3d2.78 (2008) 11confuming the Court's analysis in Leffunichv. Lettunich,
141 Idaho 425, 111 P.3d 110 (2005'1.
I.R.C.P. Rule 54(e)(3). Amount of attorney fees, provides:
In the event the court grants attorney fees to a party or parties in a civil action it shall consider the
following factors in determining the amount of such fees:
(A) The time and labor required.
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions.
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and ability of the
attorney in thc particular field of law.
(D) The prevailing charges for like work.
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case.
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(H) The undesirability of tile case.
(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(J) Awards in similar cases.
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted Legal Research), if the c o w
fmds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case.
(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case.
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In granting attorney fees pursuant to a contract, Rule 54(e)(8) provides that the
provisions of Rule 54(e) relating to attorney fees shall be applicable to the extent that the
application of this Rule 54(e) to such a claim for attorney fees would not be inconsistent with
such other statute or contract. The Trial Court erred in finding that the parties contract
provision of attorney fees precluded the application of Rule 54. See R. p. 00022.

A closer look at Idaho case law relied on by the Trial Court leads to a different
conclusion than reached by the Trial Court.
In Holmes, the request for attorney fees was made pursuant to a provision in the
property settlement agreement, which stated: "If action is instituted to enforce any of the
terms of this agreement then the losing party agrees to pay to the prevailing party all costs
l

and attorneys fees incurred in this action." Holrnes, 125 Idaho at 786 (emphasis added).
The contract provision in Lettunich I stated: "In the event of any legal action to

I

enforce the tenns of this settlement agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to

I

award of costs, including attorneys fees." Lettunich, 141 Idaho at 434 (emphasis added).
In Bank ofIdaho, the guaranty instnunent recited an agreement by Christopherson "to
pay a reasonable attorneys' fee and all other costs and expenses which may be incurred by

Bank in the enforcement of this Guaranty." Bank of Idaho v. Colley, 103 Idaho 320, 326,
647 P.2d 776 (Ct.App.1982)(emphasis added).
Z

In Decker v. Homeguard Systems, 105 Idaho 158,160,666P.2d I169 (CtApp.1983),
the trial court there awarded the disputed fees, Idaho Code

5

"Costs shall be allowed to the prevailing party unless the court
( d i r e c t s . Inany action brought by a person under this section, the court shall award,
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

in addition to the relief provided in this section, reasonable attorneys fees to the plaintiffif he
prevails...." (Emphasis added).
In Lettunich I, the Court stated it did not disagree with the findings the court made,
instead concliiding that the lower court did not properly consider the Rule 54(e)(3) criteria.
"The rule, employing the term 'shall,' is mandatory-it re~uiresthe court to consider all
eleven factors plus any other factor the court deems avvrovriate.' Id. At p. 435 (emphasis
added).
Consistent with the Court's Decision in Letlunich I,this Court recently found similar
language at play here, to require the application of the factors of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). Mihalka

v. Shepherd, 145 Idaho 547, 181 P.3d 473 (2008).
Here, the Trial Court erred in attaching significance to the word "award" in its
analysis of ihe Lettunich I case."

The contract provision in Lettunich is quite different fiom the lawyer's fees provision in the
contract between the Zenner and Mr. Holcomb which provided that the prevailing pasty is
"entitled to have it's [sic] attorney fees paid by the other party." In Lettunich the contract
provision implicitly k~vokedthe court's participation in deciding what the lawyer's fees
should he because the prevailing party was entitled to an award-which must be made by the
court--of costs which included lawyer's fees. In contrast to the contract in Lethmich, there is
nothing in the Zenners' contract with Mr. Holcomb that similarly invokes the court's
participatiol~in deciding what the lawyer's fees should he. The contractbetween the Zenners
and Mr. Holcomb simply entitles the prevailing party to have its lawyer's fees paid by the
other party. It does not mention an award of costs which would i~nplicitlyinvoke court rules
that provide for the award of costs, which include lawyer's fees.
. . . . I therefore conclude that Lethlnich is not precedent for applying Rule 54
criteria to a contract that neither explicitly nor implicitly invokes their application.
Trial Court's Memorandum Decision and Order R. pp. 00023-24.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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Clearly Zenner invoked the Court's assistance in determining what the award of
attorney fees should be. The Trial Court's analysis of the contract ignores the body of
Zenner's verified Complaint and Prayer.
Zenner requested only for the Court's award of "reasonable" attorney fees not
Zenner's actual attorney fees7
Clearly Zenner invoked the assistance of the Court in determining an award of
"reasonable" attorney fees.
The Court also fails to analyze the entirety of the parties attorney fees contractual
provision. The Court only places emphasis on the later portion of the language not analyzing
the language at the beginning of the provision that contemplates the Court's inv~lvement.~

v11.
Attorney fees and costs.
13. In order to recover damages referred to above, it has been necessary for the Plaintiffs to employ Paul
Thomas Clark of the Law Offices of Clark and Feeney, Lewiston, Idaho, to represent them in this action. The
Defendants should be ordered to pay to the Plaintiffs an amount as and for reasonable attorney fees as the
Court seemsjust, and for costs necessarily incurred for prosecuting this action pursuant to I.C. 12-120,12-121.

VIII.
Prayer for Relief
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff respectfully prayers for relief and judgment, Order and Decree of this
Court against the Defendant as follows:
C.

For an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs necessarily incurred herein;

Paragraph 20 of the Construction Contract between the Zenner's and Holcomb provides:
Attorney fees. Should anv kind of proceeding including litigation or arbitration be
necessarv to enforce the ~rovisionsofthis ameement the prevailing party shall be entitled to
have it's attorney fees and costs paid by the other party. Emphasis added

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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The lack of the use of the word "award" does not distinguish Lettunick I from the
case here. For example, the Holmes Court used the word "award" when discussillg the issue
of attomey fees, where the case involved a contract provision requiring the losing party to
pay

''acosts and attorneys fees" to the prevailing party. liolmes, 125 Idulzo ul 786.9
In Bank of Idaho v. Colley, 103 Idaho 320, 326, 647 P.2d 776 (Ct.App. 1982), the

Court noted that the bank's claim for attorney fees was based upon a contract, not upon the
discretio~~ary
power to grant attorney fees under Idaho Code 5 12-121.lo
The Court there went on to say:
Rule 54(e)(3) sets forth factors to be considered in fixing the amount of the
&. These factors are applicable wherever they would not conflict with ihe
contract or statute upon which the award is based. See Rule 54(e)(8). &
perceive no general impediment to ap~lyingthese factors in this case.
Id. utp. 326 (Emphasis added).

"he
two courts reviewing the dispute of the Lenunich family did not requires a contractual analysis of Ule
parties' agreement to determine if I.R.C.P. 54 (e)(3) applied.
10

"The provision for attorney fees in the guaranty agreement is broad and unconditional. The more restrictive
criteria set forth in Rule 54(e)(l), for determining entitlement to an award of attomey fees under Idaho Code $
12-121, are not applicable here. We conclude that the cause should be remanded to the district court with
direction to award a reasonable fee."
Bank ofldaho v. Colley, 103 Idaho 320, 326, 647 P.2d 776 (Ct.App.1962)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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In the instant case, the application of Rule S4(e)(3) factors would not conflict with the
parties contract and certainly not the pleadings of Zenner. See Lettunich 1, 141 iduho at 434-

435. The application of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) factors are consistent with the prayer for relief
made in the Zenner's Complaint.
Moreover, the Zenner's Memorandum of Costs and Affidavit of Attorney Fees, while
citing the attorney fees provision of the contract at issue, nevertheless argues that "Plaintiff
Zenner is entitled to a reasonable attorney fees (sic). . . ." R. p. 00043 (eniphasis added).
The Zenner's Me~norandumof Costs and Affidavit of Attorney Fees also states that "the sum
of $107,239.29 is reasonable to be awarded as said Plaintiffs attorney fees to be taxed as
costs. . . ." Id. (emphasis added); that "all services shown on said Exhibit " B were
reasonable and necessary"; that "the hourly rates charged for legal services above mentioned
are reasonable and were necessary. . . ."; and finally, "[ilt is the opinion of the undersigned
that the sum of $107,239.29 is a reasonable attorney fee to be awarded in this matter." R. pp.
00043-44. (Emphasis added). Clearly, Zenner expected that their contract with Holcomb
entitled them to no more than reasonable attorney fees and costs to be awarded by the Trial
Court.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

The Trial Court in its interpretation of the contract determines that the entirety of the
attorney fees will be awarded. In applying the "plain meaning" of the parties' agreement the
Trial Cowt awards paralegal time and fees as attorney fees. Holcomb did not contract for the
payment of paralegal fees."
Therefore, while Rule 54(e) permits an award of reasonable attorney fees when
provided for by statute or contract, here the Trial Court erred in finding that the contract
provision precluded it from considering the Rule 54(e)(3) factors.

ISSUE 3
+'oJ'The Trial Court erred in it's award of costs byfailing to consider ihe requirements o f
Q,&,+ &<s<''*
LR.C.P. 54(d)(l).
dcd~4G

The Trial Courts award of attorney fees is subject to the same analysis offailing to
view the award of costs as an exercise of discretion and its failure to properly exercise its

\

,

rs"

X

$iuof
@

discgtion.

lley. The Trial Court failed to analyze I.R.C.P.

\+&
54(d)(l) and apply the Rule as required or engage in any exercise of reason.
The analysis set out above in the award of attorney fees is applicable here but is not
repeated in its entirety.

"

I.R.C.P. 54(e) places the award of paralegal fees within the sound discretion of the Trial Court. Since the
Trial Court here was unwilling to interpose a reasonableness term, it should not have added a payment of
"paralegal fees" term to the parties agreement. Id Lettutzich 11. (2008). Further, there is nothing to
demonstrate that the Court saw this issue as one that required the exercise of discretion.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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kJa
CoY

Able counsel for Zenner acted consistentlywith the requirements of I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)
setting out the basis pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l) for the costs claimed to be appropriate.
Counsel did not presumptively believe based on his actions that I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l) was
not going to apply to the award of costs based on the contractual language of the parties.
However, no analysis was made by the Trial Court of the necessity of the discretionary costs
sufficient to comply with I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l). Fuller v. Wolters, 119, Idaho 415,807 P.2d 633

(1991). Just as the Court failed to demonstrate its exercise of reason in failing to apply
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l). The Cow? failed to demonstrate the exercise of discretion for an award of
costs pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l).

ISSUE 4
Holcomb is entitled their attorneyfees and costs on appeal.
Upon prevailing and consistent with the parties agreement, Holcomb is entitled to an
award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to IAR 4 1 and Idaho Code S 12-12 1. Adjei-Twum
v. Gibson, 1~080708101,Idaho (2008), Lettunich v. Lettunich -Idaho-,

(2008).

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

185 P.3d 258

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Trial Court abused its discretion in determining who is the prevailing party. The
Trial Court further abused its discretion in determining that I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l) and I.R.C.P.
54(e)(3) did not apply and in its determination of the amount of fees awarded by the Court.
Finally Holcomb is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.
DATED this

day of July 2008.

at'
Edwin L. Litteneker
Attorney for Appellant
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